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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. DO THE FACTS AND LAW SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION OF 
LAW THAT PETITIONER HAD ACQUIRED ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF 
THE ASSETS OF TRANSFERRING EMPLOYER. 
II. DID THE COMMISSION ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT A 75% ACQUISITION 
BY PETITIONER OF THE ASSETS OF TRANSFERRING EMPLOYER 
REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF TRANSFERRING EMPLOYER'S EMPLOYMENT 
HISTORY IN DETERMINING PETITIONER'S CONTRIBUTION RATE. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
If an employer has acquired all or substantially 
all the assets of another employer and the other 
employer had discontinued operations upon the 
acquisition, the period of liability with respect to 
the filing of contribution reports, the payment of 
contributions, after January 1, 1985, the benefit costs 
of both employers, and the payrolls of both employers 
during the qualifying period shall be jointly con-
sidered for the purpose of determining and establishing 
party's qualifications for an experience rating 
classification. The transferring employer shall 
be divested of his payroll experience. 
Section 35-4-7(c)(1)(C), U.C.A. (1953 as amended)(in part). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Scott L. Theurer, DMD (Petitioner) fresh out of dental 
school began his first dentistry practice on or about July 1, 
2 
1984 in Logan, Utah. Petitioner had acquired assets for his 
business from Dr. Steven S. Larson (Larson or Transfering 
Employer). Larson temporarily discontinued active permanent 
practice in Logan and moved out of state for the purpose of 
obtaining specialization training. Petitioner purchased dental 
equipment from Larson for the amount of $52,750. Larson retained 
various hand tools, casting machine, etc. valued by Petitioner to 
be approximately $4,000. Larson also retained his accounts 
receivable valued by Petitioner at approximately $41,206. 
Petitioner also contracted with Larson to lease the premises 
which Larson previously occupied for his practice for two years 
with no options for Petitioner thereafter. Larson owns the 
premises. The value of the premises is estimated as $66,000. 
Petitioner also made a lease agreement with Larson to lease his 
Lewiston office equipment valued at $10,000. At the time of 
transition between Larson and Petitioner's practice, Petitioner 
estimated Larson's business assets at $173,956. Petitioner paid 
Larson a total of $55,000. The purchase price represented 30% of 
the value of the assets owned and operated by Larson in his 
practice. 
The total purchase price included dental equipment and a 
letter of introduction. The letter of introduction informed 
Larson's patients that he was leaving the area and recommended 
Petitioner to continue with providing their dental care. 
The purchase agreement between the two doctors also 
contained a restrictive covenant that Larson would not practice 
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or renew as the equivalent of Petitioner having purchased 
Larson's office building. In addition, Petitioner asserts that 
the clear language of the statute requires a showing that the 
Petitioner acquired "all" or "substantially all" of the assets of 
Larson, and that a mere majority of the assets does not meet the 
statutory requirement which would impose the joint consideration 
provision which the Commission seeks to apply. 
In this case, such joint consideration increases 
Petitioner's contribution rate from the minimum to the maximujn 
rate possible and thereby has a substantially negative financial 
impact on the Petitioner's business. Petitioner now asks this 
Court to review and reverse the determination and conclusion of 
the Commission. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE FACTS AND LAW DO NOT SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S 
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT PETITIONER ACQUIRED ALL OR 
SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE TRANSFERRING 
EMPLOYER. 
The Commission erred in treating a two year non-renewable 
non-optional lease obtained by Petitioner from transferring 
employer on transferring employer's office building as if it were 
a purchase of the building. The Commission also erred in 
considering a letter of introduction from the transferring 
employer on behalf of the Petitioner as a transfer of patients. 
Such errors cause the Commission to erroneously conclude that the 
Petitioner acquired 7 5% of transferring employer's assets rather 
than 30%. 
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added.). The clear language of the statute requires that before 
there can be a joint consideration for the purpose of determining 
the acquiring employer's contribution rate, such acquiring 
employer must have acquired "all or substantially all of the 
assets" of the transferring employer. 
In the Commission's Findings and Conclusions which appear in 
the Record of Review on p. 5-6, the Commission apparently 
concludes that by leasing the transferring employer's office 
building for two years without any options to renew or options to 
purchase, that such lease is the equivalent of "acquiring" that 
real asset. In the Commission's Findings of Fact, the Commission 
finds that the Petitioner's purchase price represents only 30% of 
the value of the assets owned and operated by the transferring 
employer in his practice, excluding the lease on the office. In 
concluding that the Petitioner acquired 75% of the transferring 
employer's assets, the Commission apparently considered the full 
$66,000 which was estimated to be the fair market value of the 
realty as if the Petitioner had acquired it in fee simple. 
Clearly, a two year lease with no options is substantially less 
than the full fee simple value of the property. 
The lease which was signed between the Petitioner and the 
transferring employer, Review Record, p. 45-49, provides for a 
monthly rent of $500.00 for two years. Therefore, the total 
maximum value of the lease is $12,000. Petitioner submits that 
the $12,000 would be a more accurate valuation of the value of 
the lease or its possessory rights in determining the value of 
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assets transferred between the two employers. If that valuation 
was used as Petitioner suggests, the total value of assets 
acquired by Petitioner from the transferring employer would be 
approximately 39%. The Petitioner suggests that 39% is sign-
ificantly less than the "all or substantially all" of the assets 
contemplated by the legislature or the "majority" as concluded by 
the Commission. 
The Commission appears to be especially concerned with the 
application of the word acquire as applied in the applicable 
statute. Although the Commission may be correct in its 
definition of acquire, it is the valuation of the assets that are 
acquired by means other than purchase which is the concern of the 
Petitioner. The definition of acquire in Black's Law Dictionary 
includes the definition applied by the Commission in its 
Conclusions. Review Record, p. 6. However, a full reading of 
the definition indicates that the law of contracts contemplates 
that the person acquiring an asset would "become owner of 
property; to make property one's own". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 
41 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968). In the case at bar, Petitioner's 
acquiring of the building asset is simply the acquiring of a 
possessory right and he is certainly not a fee simple "owner." A 
possessory right for two years is and should be considered 
substantially less than all or substantially all of the realty 
asset of the transferring employer. Here, the Commission clearly 
erred. 
The Commission also concludes that the Petitioner acquired a 
3 
''majority" of the transferring employer's patients. Record of 
Review, p. 6. The Commission apparently arrives at this conclu-
sion based on the fact that Petitioner indicated that he had 
retained approximately 700 to 900 of the transferring employer's 
dental patients. The Commission apparently assumes that the 
Petitioner's retainage of patients was due strictly to a letter 
of introduction sent to the transferring employer's dental 
patients introducing the Petitioner. The Commission failed to 
consider the unique relationship between doctor and patient which 
would make a letter of introduction rather insignificant with 
respect to how one chooses a dentist and it appears that the 
Commission refused to consider that the Petitioner's retainage of 
a significant number of the transferring employer's patients may 
well have been due to his personality, place of education, and 
apparent competence in his practice. 
Where this Court is required to give statutory 
interpretation it is well established that the' Court is permitted 
to investigate the legislative intent behind the law being 
interpreted. Continental Oil Co. v. Bd. of Review of 
Indus. Comm., 568 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah, 1977). It seems clear 
that the intent of the legislature was not to impose what in this 
case would be the harsh results of the law as the Commission 
would have it be applied. Here we have a young dentist fresh out 
of dental school attempting to strike out on his own and 
establish a dental practice in a local community of the state. 
He is not acquiring an ongoing wholesale or retail consumer goods 
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business or manufacturing business wherein the consumption of his 
product would be virtually unchanged and unaffected by his 
acquisition. The Petitioner's business involves a very personal 
professional service. A patient has a wide variety of dentists 
to choose from in a community and a patient's choice of dentists 
would be clearly made based on many variables and solely not on 
the basis of a letter of introduction. 
In addition, it should be noted that the transferring 
employer left the state only on a temporary basis so that he 
could acquired * specialization education in the field of 
dentistry. The non-competition clause was simply a restriction 
on the transferring employer from practicing general dentistry in 
the are and did not restrict his practice in his area of 
specialty. Therefore, the impact and value of the letter of 
introduction and non-competition are of insigificant importance 
in evaluating the amount of assets actually transferred to the 
Petitioner. What should be given more weight is the fact that 
the Petitioner had nothing to do with the employment history of 
the transferring employer, nor was he even a part of the 
transferring employer's profession at the time that history was 
established. The Petitioner did not continue employing the same 
employees that were retained by the transferring employer and in 
every way really began a whole new business and dental practice. 
In fact, the facts will show that the transferring employer 
retained a significant amount of his dental equipment and that he 
shall continue to practice dentistry in the area. The 
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transferring employer retained his accounts receivable and 
retained the dental equipment used in his Lewiston office. 
Finally, it is well established and adopted by this Court 
that taxing statutes, as the applicable statute is, should be 
strictly construed against the taxing authority and favorably 
construed to the taxpayer. Continental Telephone Co. of Utah 
v. State Tax Com'n, 539 P.2d 447, 450 (1975). Such construction 
is certainly in order here. The clear language of the statute 
should be strictly construed against the state and based on the 
finding of the Commission that the Petitioner acquired only 3 0% 
of the value of the total assets owned by the transferring 
employer, the joint consideration for determining the contri-
bution rate of Petitioner should not be allowed. 
II. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A 7 5% 
ACQUISITION BY PETITIONER OF THE ASSETS OF TRANSFERRING 
EMPLOYER REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF TRANSFERRING 
EMPLOYER'S EMPLOYMENT HISTORY IN DETERMINING 
PETITIONER'S CONTRIBUTION RATE. 
Even if this Court allows the Commission's interpretation of 
the word acguire to include the value of the realty of the 
transferring employer even though the Petitioner has only a lease 
on the realty for a period of two years, a strict interpretation 
of the language of the applicable statute should disallow the 
joint consideration in determining Petitioner's contribution 
rate* The Commission concludes, after including the fair market 
fee simple value of transferring employer's office building, that 
the Petition acquired "75%" or "the majority" of the transferring 
employer's assets. Record of Review, p. 6. Even assuming the 
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Commission is correct in its conclusions, the clear language of 
the statute requires a showing that the Petitioner acquired "all" 
or "substantially "all" of the assets of the transferring 
employer. Although 75% is clearly a majority, it is stretching 
it to conclude that 75% equals the nall or substantially all" as 
contemplated by the legislature. There is no language in the 
applicable statute which says anything about a "majority of the 
assets". 
Again, the Petitioner here is entitled to a strict 
construction by . the Court against the taxing authority and in 
favor of Petitioner. See Id. In this case the Commission is 
seeking to increase the tax burden of the Petitioner as a result 
of actions which were totally and completely beyond his control, 
which took place prior to his even being an employer in the field 
and classification of employment being considered, and in a 
business area involving professional services wherein it is 
impossible to purchase good will and to guarantee by the purchase 
that any patients will continue with the Petitioner after he 
acquires assets of the transferring employer. Clearly, in this 
case the Petitioner is entitled to the strict construction rule 
regarding taxing statutes. 
Based on the Commission's Findings of Fact, Record of 
Review, p. 5, there are no facts which would justify or sub-
stantiate a conclusion by the Commission that the Petitioner 
acquired "all or substantially all" of the assets of the 
transferring employer. Indeed, the Findings of the Commission in 
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fact support the opposite conclusion. The Commission clearly 
finds that the value of the assets acquired by the Petitioner, 
excluding the realty, equals only 30% of the value of the 
transferring employer's assets of his practice. The additional 
45% which the Commission finds equals the total amount of assets 
acquired by the Petitioner (7 5% total) is derived solely from the 
$66,000 estimate of the fair market value of the office building, 
which office building was never transferred in fee simple and is 
subject only to a two year lease with no options by the 
Petitioner. The maximum total value of the lease is only 
$12,000, and that is assuming that the lease is paid in full 
through its term. A Finding and/or Conclusion by the Commission 
that the Petitioner has acquired 75% of the assets of the 
transferring employer is clearly arbitrary and capricious and 
unsupported by the facts and in fact contradictory to the 
specific conclusions of the the Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
A strict construction of Section 35-4-7(c)(1)(C) in favor of 
the taxpayer would clearly disallow the joint consideration of 
the Petitioner and transferring employer's employment history in 
determining Petitioner's contribution rate to the unemployment 
fund. The clear language of the statute requires a determination 
by the Commission that "all or substantially all" of the assets 
of the transferring employer were acquired by the Petitioner. 
The facts clearly show that the Petitioner acquired only approx-
imately 30% of the assets of the Petitioner. A strict construe-
13 
tion would not allow the commission to include in its valuation 
of acquired assets the fair market value of realty where the 
Petitioner has only received a two year non-option lease. In 
fact, strict construction of the statute would not allow the 
Commission to consider the lease as an asset at all. The lease 
is clearly an arms length agreement and at the prevailing lease 
rate. In addition, the Commission was arbitrary and capricious in 
determining the amount of assets to be 75% by including the fair 
market value of the realty when the maximum value of the two year 
lease would be only $12,000. 
Finally, even if the Commission is correct in concluding 
that the Petitioner acquired 75% of the transferring employer's 
business assets, such conclusion is not supported by the facts, 
is contradictory to the conclusions, and does not meet the strict 
requirements of the statute. On one hand the Commission 
concludes that the Petitioner acquired 75% of the assets and 
calls that "the majority" of the transferring employer's assets, 
and on the other hand it wants the Court to accept 7 5% as "all or 
substantially all" of the assets. If the legislature intended 
the statute to read "all or the majority of all the assets" it 
would have done so. All or substantially all is significantly 
more than a mere majority and is clearly more than 7 5%. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Petitioner is 
entitled to a reversal of the decision of the Industrial 
Commission so that his contribution rate to the unemployment fund 
be consistent with any other new young dentist in the community 
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just starting to practice. To find otherwise would be contrary 
to public policy of encouraging young professionals from 
establishing their practices in this state and in treating all 
taxpayers fairly without any expos_ facto effect in application of 
the law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J/^ day of December, 1985. 
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